**Autoimmunism**

#### The United States is in an autoimmune crisis, brought about by its response to the war on terror. The increase in indefinite detention of citizens, permanent residents, and foreigners marks another step towards becoming the so-called “Other” we are furiously and constantly securitizing against. Autoimmunism becomes the need to securitize all of humanity in the name of a controllable future. This manipulation of temporal politics allows torture, dehumanization, and genocide to become acceptable practices of the present.

**Stockdale 10** (Liam, P.D., Ph.D. in International Relations, Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Stockdale.pdf>)

While the idea of **pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most¶ often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine** in US foreign policymaking0—most clearly¶ exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber¶ 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption—**is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations¶ alone.** Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, **the logic of pre-emption can be seen¶ to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment**, to the point¶ where **the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption”**¶ (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of **safeguarding¶ the future from what may occur** by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are¶ conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus **pursued by attempting to “police¶ the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future¶ perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will¶ no longer be of concern (**Bigo 2007: 31).¶ Accordingly, **the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over**¶ **the temporal dimension of human existence.** **Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic¶ of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to¶ manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations**¶ about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into¶ the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008:¶ 149). The crucial point is that **a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is¶ concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in ¶ instrumental terms as a site of intervention** through which this ultimate aim might be realized.¶ As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption,¶ the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). **The result is that the proverbial door is opened ¶ for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the¶ present,** since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be¶ ensured.Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are¶ necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus **generating “an insatiable quest for¶ knowledge**” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information **related to potential¶ future dangers** (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts,¶ however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of¶ uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed¶ and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de¶ Goede 2008). **This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of¶ risk management** premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” **whereby sovereign ¶ decisions** relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken **are made solely on the¶ basis of unsubstantiated suspicion** or highly arbitrary **(and often highly racialized) calculations**¶ regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102).¶ Accordingly, **the** pre-emptive **practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical¶ character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an¶ crucial component of the pursuit of security**. The securitization of the future thus necessitates¶ the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional¶ military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric¶ monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of¶ danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau ¶ and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a¶ precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the¶ ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

#### Indefinite detention represents a racialized act of judgement whereby the government collects increasing amounts of power, exercising its sovereignty in an attempt to maintain security.

**Butler 3,** Judith Butler, INDEFINITE DETENTION, numero 35 gennaio 2003, la rivista del manifesto, <http://www.larivistadelmanifesto.it/originale/35A20030115.html>

On March 21st of this year, the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, issued new guidelines for the military tribunals in which some of the detained suspected terrorists and captured prisoners, domestically and in Guantanamo Bay, would be tried by the U.S. What has been striking about these detentions from the start, and continues to be alarming is that the right to legal counsel and, indeed, the right to a trial has not been granted to most of these detainees. The new **military tribunals are**, in fact, **not courts of law to which** the **detainees are entitled. Some will be tried, and others will not, and at the time of this writing, none have been tried at all. The Geneva Convention’s right to counsel, to means of appeal, and to expatriation, have not been granted to any of the detainees in Guantanamo,** **and** although **the U.S.** has announced its recognition of the Taliban as “covered” by the Geneva Accord, it **has made clear that** even **the Taliban do not have POW status;** indeed, **no prisoner in Guantanamo does. In the name of a security alert and national emergency, the law is effectively suspended in both its national and international forms**. **And with the suspension of law comes a new exercise of state sovereignty, one that not only takes place outside the law, but through an elaboration of administrative bureaucracies in which officials now decide not only who will be tried, and who will be detained, but hold ultimate power over whether someone may be detained indefinitely.** With the publication of the new regulations, the U.S. government holds that a number of detainees at Guantanamo will not be given trials at all, but detained indefinitely. On the one hand, it is crucial to ask, **under what conditions do human lives cease to become eligible for basic, if not universal, human rights? How does the U.S. government construe these conditions?** **And to what extent is there a racial and ethnic frame through which these imprisoned lives are viewed and judged such that they are judged as less than human, or has having departed from the recognizable human community?** On the other hand, **in maintaining that some prisoners will be detained indefinitely, the state allocates to itself a power, an indefinitely prolonged power, to exercise judgements on who is dangerous and without entitlement to basic legal rights**. In detaining some prisoners indefinitely, **the state appropriates for itself a sovereign power that is defined over and against existing legal frameworks, civil, military, and international.** **The military tribunals may well acquit someone of a crime, but that acquittal is not only subject to mandatory executive review, but the** **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense **has also made clear that acquittal will not necessarily end detention.** Moreover, according to the new tribunal regulations, **this tried in such a venue will have no rights of appeal to U.S. civil courts**. Here we can see that **the law** itself **is either suspended, or regarded as an instrument that the state may use in the service of constraining and monitoring a given population; the state is not subject to the rule of law, but law can be suspended or deployed tactically and partially to suit the requirements of a sovereign state that acts in the name of its own self-preservation, but also, in that name, extends its own power to imprison some group of people indefinitely without trial. In the very act by which state sovereignty suspends law, or contorts law to its own uses, it extends its own domain, its own necessity, and develops the means by which the justification of its own power takes place.** The state augments its own power in at least two ways. In the context of the **military tribunals**, the trials **are effectively advisory to the executive branch, since the executive branch will not only decide whether or not a “detainee” will stand trial, but will appoint the tribunal, review the process, and have final say over matters of guilt and innocence as well as on the punishment**, if any, to be received. Because **detainees are not entitled to these trials, but may be offered them at the will of executive power, there is no semblance of separation of powers** in these circumstances. For those who are detained indefinitely, their cases will be reviewed by officials - not by courts - on a periodic basis. **These acts are themselves not grounded in law, but in another form of judgment.** In this sense, **they are already outside the sphere of law**, **since the determination of when and where, for instance, a trial might be waived and detention deemed indefinite does not take place within a legal process**; it is not a decision, for instance, made by a judge, for which evidence must be submitted, or a case that must be made that meets certain established criteria or conforms to certain protocols of evidence and argument. **It is a unilateral judgement made by** officials, **government officials, who** simply **deem that a given individual or,** indeed, a **group poses a danger to the state.** **This act of “deeming” takes place in the context of a state of emergency that is understood to warrant the suspension of law, including due process for these individuals. But if detention may be indefinite**, and such detentions are presumably justified on the basis of a state of emergence, **then the government is imagining a protracted, if not indefinite state of emergency.** Indeed, **whereas it makes sense that the U.S. government would take immediate steps to detain those who against whom there is evidence that they intend to wage violence against the U.S., it seems important to question whether the government now extends conditions of national emergency such that the state will now have recourse to extra-legal detention and the suspension of established law, both domestic and international, for the foreseeable future.** Indeed, the “**indefinite” detention** of the untried prisoner - or the prisoner tried by military tribunal and detained, regardless of the outcome - is a practice that **presupposes the indefinite extension of the war on terrorism.** And **if this “war” becomes a permanent part of the state apparatus**, a condition which justifies and extends the use of military tribunals, **then the executive branch has set up its own judiciary function**, **one that overrides the separation of power, the writ of habeas corpus** (for the Guantanamo Bay prisoners), **and the entitlement to due process.** These prisoners are detained, indefinitely; they are not really called “prisoners” since then the rights pertaining to prisoners would come into play. They are “detainees,” those who are held in waiting, those for whom waiting may well be without end. **To the extent that the state arranges for this pre-legal state as an “indefinite” one, it maintains that there will be those held by the government for whom the law does not apply, not only in the present, but for the indefinite future.** In other words, there will be those for whom the protection of law is indefinitely postponed. **The state, in the name of its right to protect itself and, hence, in the name of its sovereignty, extends its power in excess of the law**; for if the detention is indefinite, then so, too, is the lawless exercise of state sovereignty. In this sense, in**definite detention provides the condition for the indefinite exercise of extra-legal state power.** Although the justification for not providing trials, and the attendant rights of due process, legal counsel, rights of appeal, and so on, is that we are in a state of national emergency, a state understood as out of the ordinary, it nevertheless follows from the practice of indefinite detention that this extra-legal power of the state will be extended indefinitely as well. **This is**, then, **not an exceptional circumstance, but a means by which the extra-legal exercise of state power justifies itself** more or less **indefinitely, installing itself as a more or less permanent feature of political life in the U.S.**. The military tribunals are understood to apply not only to those arrested within the U.S., but for “high-ranking” officials currently detained in Guantanamo Bay. The Washington Post reported that “there may be little use for the tribunals because the great majority of the 300 prisoners being held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are low-ranking foot soldiers. Administration **officials have other plans for many of the relatively junior captives now at Guantanamo Bay: indefinite detention without trial. U.S. officials would take this action with prisoners they fear could pose a danger of terrorism even if they have little evidence of past crimes.”** “Could pose a danger of terrorism.” **This means that conjecture is the basis of detention, but also that conjecture is the basis of an indefinite detention without trial.** One could simply respond to these events by saying that everyone detained deserves a trial, and I do believe that is the right thing to say, and I am saying that. But saying that would not be enough, since we have to look at what constitutes a trial in the cases where a detainee would be tried in these new military tribunals. What kind of trial does everyone deserve?

#### The racism inherent in US justification of indefinite detention- abducting differently colored bodies from around the world and within US borders based on sharing characteristics we’ve been taught to associate with danger and instability- spills over to domestic policies as well. The desire for a “sterile” nation informs our relationship with the local Other.

**Johnson 10’** (Andrew, Lecturer at Open University, The Pathology of Politics: Derrida’s reading of Auto-immunity and Carl Schmitt 09/12/10)

**Auto-immunity** is a concept that **seeks to undermine** this **dependence upon the self** in political philosophy. Take the example of **democracy**: In its constitutive autoimmunity, **in its vocation of hospitality** (with everything in the¶ ipse¶ that works over the etymology and experience of the¶ hospes¶ through the aporias of hospitality), democracy **has always wanted** by turns and at the same time **two incompatible things**: it has wanted, on the one hand, **to welcome only men,** and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and compeers, **excluding all the others**, in particular bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others, **and**, on the other hand, at the same time or by turns, it has wanted **to open itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded.** In both cases, let us recall, and here is a problem I take up elsewhere, this **hospitality remains limited and conditional**. But even in this restricted space it **is typical for the democracy to do one or the other**, sometimes one and the other, sometime both at the same time and/or by turns**. Rogues or degenerates are sometimes brothers**, citizens, compeers (Rogues, p. 63).2¶ **Derrida locates within democracy a “¶ constitutive autoimmunity ,” that seeks to immunize itself against threats and at the same moment remain open to excluded populations. Thus its constitutive logic is at heart paradoxical. Democracy, by definition, is exemplar of the essential¶ aporia¶ of auto-immunity: by its constitution, it is unable to recognize its mode of protection from its open hospitality to the other. Derrida’s use of auto-immunity becomes political, insofar as it describes the defense mechanisms put into place by a state to protect itself from what is outside and foreign. Immunity, auto-immunity, both biological and political, is an entire way of thinking of security, of borders, of protection schemes, but also, inversely, the means and extent of one’s hospitality. Auto-immunity, as a political concept, describes the immune system of the nation-state itself. Whereas democracy is threatened by its own mode of security/immunity, it has the audacity to hope for an unconditional hospitality that might create an ethically imperative politics.**

#### This is results in a psychological priming of individuals for globalized conflict- we are conditioned to ignore structural violence as the mere “condition of peace.” The distinction between war and peace becomes blurred as we are assured a greater and more fantastic threat is constantly looming over the horizon. Our greatest priority as activists and academics must be to call attention to the intentionally ignored state-sanction torture and murder of the “Other”. Any position that does not start from this recognition will only be co-opted by collective denial and fear- the prerequisite for the wholesale slaughter of entire populations.

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

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(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). **Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities.** More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. **The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder**. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, **it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times**. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and **there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes**, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), **constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”** to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. **These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.** As Wittgenstein observed**, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted**. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. **Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war**. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. **The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent?** What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end **it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. **Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency**” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” **Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.** Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence**. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide.** But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. **Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.** It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting **that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified**. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. **They harbor the** early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the **“priming”** (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) **that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life** and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### This is carried out by the elites who have used a constant state of emergency to gain control of the military industrial complex. Foreign policy tactics have been reduced to the Precautionary Principle- striking any would-be threat and using war as our primary means of communication with the Middle East.

**Addis 7**(Boston University Law Review, Vol 87:323 <http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume87n2/documents/ADDISv.2.pdf>)

The war on terror is radically recasting the notion of preemptive self-defense from that of an emergency measure designed to allow a state to respond to an imminent threat, to one by which a state (in this case **the United States) plays the role of guarantor of international peace and security,** a role the Charter ¶ explicitly allocates to the Security Council.54 The reallocation of war-making ¶ power is being effected without an amendment to the Charter. There is no ¶ dispute **that in the era of weapons of mass destruction the international ¶ community must be proactive, not merely reactive, in the maintenance of ¶ global peace and security**. The debate lies in who should authorize such action ¶ and whether the self-defense principle should be transformed into a means by ¶ which each state plays the role of the guarantor of international peace and ¶ security. The Bush doctrine of preventive war threatens to lead to the reallocation of ¶ international war-making power. As part of a new National Security Strategy ¶ and the war on terror, **the Bush administration** has **called for preventive attacks ¶ on so-called “rogue states”** who may be potential enemies, **even though their ¶ intentions** and their capacity **to threaten the United States were not yet clear**.55¶ **The rationale** for the policy is that living in an age of terrorism, where an ¶ attack could come at any time and from anywhere, **requires the United States ¶ to defend itself by attacking rogue state**s that give shelter to terrorist groups ¶ and those who seek to develop weapons of mass destruction which may end up ¶ in terrorist hands. The plan is **to deprive terrorists of hiding places and rogue ¶ states of the capacity to inflict great damage on the United States in the ¶ future**.56 Some commentators have likened this policy of preventive attack to ¶ **the** well-known “**Precautionary Principle**” employed in the health and ¶ environmental fields, which **states that lack of scientific certainty should not forestall an action that might prevent serious or irreversible harm**.57 This ¶ comparison is borne out by the following passage in the National Security ¶ Strategy:¶ We cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . **The greater the threat, the ¶ greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for ¶ taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains** ¶ as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent ¶ such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, ¶ act preemptively.58 The invasion of Iraq was at one time justified as a preventive action,59 and the ¶ U.S. administration has not precluded the possibility that Iran could also be a ¶ target of that policy.¶ **The** Bush preventive (precautionary) **doctrine not only dispenses with the ¶ requirement of imminence, but also shifts the burden to the target states to ¶ demonstrate that they do not harbor terrorists or WMDs, and are not in the ¶ process of developing WMDs**.60 The notion of **preventive self-defense** that the ¶ Bush administration has put forward **therefore undermines the idea that self defense is an emergency measure designed to deal with imminent threats**. ¶ Further, **this** version of self-defense **undermines the notion that those who ¶ claim there is a threat have the burden of demonstrating that a risk exists** and ¶ that it cannot be prevented by any other means. The report of the High-Level ¶ Panel, established by the Secretary-General to advise him on the major issues facing the U.N. and the world, cautions that **such** preventive military action ¶ **will transform the allocation of war-making power**. Additionally, the report ¶ states that “in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global ¶ order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is ¶ simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action . . . to be ¶ accepted.”61 Under the doctrine of preventive war, **a war-making measure that ¶ was devised to deal with emergencies becomes part of the arsenal of ordinary ¶ foreign policy strategies.** This, of course, takes us back to the pre-WWII ¶ paradigm that the United Nations regime was meant to have abolished.¶ The notion of preventive attack that the Bush administration has adopted as ¶ an official policy is **premised on the idea that the United States has been ¶ engaged in a war since at least September 11.** Winning the war under this ¶ policy requires preventive attacks that will impair the capacities of not only ¶ known enemies but also potential enemies, preventing both known and ¶ potential risks. Conceptualizing the struggle against terrorism as a war and ¶ viewing preventive attacks as necessary to successfully prosecute the war turns ¶ the measure that was developed to respond to emergencies into an ordinary ¶ instrument of foreign policy. Such a view also leads to the restructuring of the ¶ allocation of war-making powers that was carefully developed by the U.N. ¶ Charter and the United Nations system.¶ The idea of preventive war is an informal suspension **of the principle of self defense.** The principle of self-defense is not formally suspended or dispensed ¶ with, but is **drastically altered in the name of applying it to this perceived new ¶ circumstance**.62 A doctrine that was carefully crafted to deal with emergencies ¶ has, through the policy of preventive war, been transformed into an ordinary ¶ foreign and military policy option, the very thing that the post-WWII ¶ international order was meant to have rejected.63¶ The effect of the war on terror on the principle of self-defense – and on ¶ other aspects of national and international law – is **evidenced in more than the ¶ restructuring of the allocation of powers and the transformation of emergency ¶ measures into ordinary processes**. It is also contributing to a condition where, **in the name of fighting terrorism, the evil Other,64 the United States is turning ¶ on its own body, namely, the institutions and processes that define it** and that ¶ perhaps are the country’s best hope for providing immunity from the threats ¶ that terrorism poses. Put simply, **the war on terror is leading to an ¶ autoimmunity crisis.**

#### The racialized decision-making process justifies violence against the other – things like nuclear war are only possible because elites never stop to consider those who will have to live with the consequences of their decisions.

**Anthony ‘95**

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**Nuclear weapons are tools of a conquering, violent culture. Racism at domestic** and international **levels heightens the potential vulnerability and miscalculation surrounding nuclear proliferation**. **Few people of color have had any role in debate, development, or decision-making about the goals of this brutal technology. In a nuclear ~~holocaust~~ [war] whole populations will be vaporized** in the flash of an eye. **People deciding the appropriateness of such a choice inevitably would bring their prejudices and fears to the** devastating **decision** to annihilate whole peoples. **The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of a Eurocentric technological elite, paranoid about the aims and aspirations of the majority of the world's population—people of color—magnifies the potential for global disaster**. **The great and growing gulf of human communication between the rich and poor**, European and non-European, **multiplies the potential antagonism that could result in planetary ~~holocaust~~ war.** In this context **organizing against nuclear proliferation is, by definition, a multicultural effort,** **bringing the intelligence and wisdom of every community to the global task of defeating the excesses of racism, human aggression, and technology-gone-berserk.**

**Adv. 2 is the Public Sphere**

**The status quo represents a forced depolitization caused by the totalizing drive for stability which has prioritized geopolitics over human rights. Deconstructing that mode of social control is key to preventing tyranny and more important than attempts to lay predetermined solutions on top of vast and complicated problems.**

Alex **Thomson**, lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow, Deconstruction and Democracy, **2005**, p. 196-197

The affirmation of this kind of analysis would need to be articulated with whatever directly strategic interventions are possible: for example either the affirmation of particular cosmopolitan or internationalist treaties and organizations, or their critique. The task of thought would be to judge as best one can which moment is most propitious for either. I have shown that Derrida’s comments on hospitality, the cosmopolitical and international law are consistent with this proposition. Such work would mean translating deconstruction not only from one institutional context to another, or showing deconstruction to be already at work there, but from one national or state context to another, and from one philosophical idiom to another. But in addition to its more familiar form as intellectual genealogy, a negotiation with the tradition of inherited political concepts, I have suggested that **deconstruction might** also **be** the model for **a mode of political analysis,** which would be **concerned with** **the** political **event as a combination of a set of depoliticizing tendencies, which together testify to the possibility of a repoliticization**. This is a project which exceeds the scope of this book. It also remains essentially ambiguous, and highly susceptible to the necessary and inevitable institutionalization of deconstruction which Derrida describes in his paper ‘Some statements and truisms ...’, and which can itself be understood as more or less equivalent to what I have designated as depoliticization. **Such analyses would have to develop out of the events themselves, rather than approaching a particular political problem with a predetermined deconstructive grid** to lay over it. Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is what happens, that deconstruction is democracy, means not only that deconstruction can be considered as a political practice. It must lead us not only to see deconstruction as politics, but politics as deconstruction. Indeed, a deconstructive account of politics might focus not so much on what deconstruction has to say about politics, as on what politics has to tell us about deconstruction. The structure I have set out in this chapter is well described in these remarks: All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since conventions, institutions and consensus are stabilizations, this means they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because **stability is not natural**; it is because there is instability, that stabilization is necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now this **chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is** at once **naturally the worst against which we struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same it is a chance**, a chance to change, **to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other.** [DAP 83-4] In this context we can understand depoliticization as the effect of a stabilization in the political field. ‘**Chaos and instability’** **becomes** another name for what Derrida calls ‘**democracy-to-come’** and ‘justice’ elsewhere. Depoliticizing stabilizations of this field of forces are necessary; but **until we think chaos itself as fundamental, no** kind of **political thought will be able to grasp the 'chance** to change’ or destabilize. **This is what deconstruction offers to political theory, and it depends directly on the apparent refusal to repoliticize**, to introduce a new ontology of politics. Deconstruction is apparently both the most radical and the most ascetic alternative to such theories as those of Schmitt and Benjamin, by seeking to discover a revolutionary potential in the everyday, to discern the possibility of destabilization attested to in the maintenance of the law, and to put into question political theory as in and of itself depoliticizing. Yet Derrida insists that **repoliticization only has a chance if a decision could be thought without criteria, without rules or any defined or expected outcome**. In the vocabulary of his essay 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other’, ‘the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible’ but ‘an invention of the impossible is impossible [.. .] It is in this paradoxical predicament that a deconstruction gets under way [qu'est engagée]’ [PSY 60 / 59]. But this is not to resign ourselves to just anything happening. As Derrida argues in ‘Force of Law’, **‘incalculable justice requires us to calculate’** [POL 28 / 61]. **This calculation will not be without risk, but even in the worst circumstances, ‘there is no ethico-politi**cal decision or **gesture without** what [Derrida] would call **a “Yes” to emancipation'** [DAP 82].

**Our advocacy is to embrace an ethic of deconstruction. This is essential to confront the massive every day instances of violence which support the international system. Deconstruction demands a constant attention to the particularities of power structures in order to rupture them through repolitization of academics within this debate round.
Derrida 1995**, dir d’etudes @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Jacques, The Gift of Death  83-7

What is thus found at work in everyday discourse, in the exercise of justice, and first and foremost in the axiomatics of private, public, or international law, in the conduct of internal politics, diplomacy, and war, is a lexicon concerning responsibility that can be said to hover vaguely about a concept that is nowhere to be found, even if we can’t go so far as to say that it doesn’t correspond to any concept at all. It amounts to a disavowal whose resources, as once knows, are inexhaustible. One simply keeps on denying the aporia and antimony, tirelessly, and one treats as nihilist, relativist, even poststructuralist, and worse still deconstructionist, all those who remain concerned in the face of such a display of good conscience. The sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination in the eyes of all, and it should continue to be seen for what it is—atrocious, criminal, unforgivable; Kierkegaard insists on that. The ethical point of view must remain valid: Abraham is a murderer. However, is it not true that the spectacle of this murder, which seems intolerable in the denseness and rhythm of its theatricality, is at the same time the most common event in the world? Is it not inscribed in the structure of our existence to the extent of no longer constituting an event? It will be said that it would be most improbable for the sacrifice of Isaac to be repeated in our day; and it certainly seems that way. We can hardly imagine a father taking is son to be sacrificed on the top of the hill at Montmarte. If God didn’t send a lamb as a substitute or an angel to hold back his arm, there would still be a prosecutor, preferably with an expertise in Middle Eastern violence, to accuse him of infanticide or first-degree murder; and if a psychiatrist who was both something of a psychoanalyst and something f a journalist declared that the father was “responsible,” carrying on as if psychoanalysis had done nothing to upset the order of discourse on intention, conscience, good will, etc., the criminal father would have no chance of getting away with it. He might claim that the wholly other had ordered him to do it, and perhaps in secret (how would he know that?), in order to test his faith, but it would make no difference. Things are such that this man would surely be condemned by any civilized society. On the other hand, **the smooth functioning of such a society, the monotonous complacency of its discourses on morality, politics,** and the law, and the exercise of its rights (whether public, private, national or international), **are in no way impaired by the fact that, because of the structure of the laws of the market that society has instituted and controls, because of the mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same “society” puts to death or** (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for only a minor difference) **allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children** (those neighbors or fellow humans that ethics or the discourse of the rights of man refer to) **without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself**. Not only is it true that **such a society** participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually **organizes it.** The smooth functioning of its economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and good conscience and **presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice**. And such a sacrifice is not even invisible, for from time to time television shows us, while keeping them at a distance, a series of intolerable images, and a few voices are raised to bring it all to our attention. But these images and voices are completely powerless to induce the slightest effective change in the situation, to assign the least responsibility, to furnish anything more than a convenient alibi. That this order is founded upon a bottomless chaos (the abyss or open mouth) is something that will necessarily be brought home one day to those who just as necessarily forget the same. We are not even talking about wars, the less recent or most recent ones, in which cases one can wait an eternity for morality or international law (whether violated with impunity or invoked hypocritically) to determine with any degree of certainty who is responsible or guilty for the hundreds of thousands of victims who are sacrificed for what or whom one knows not, countless victims, each of those whose singularity becomes each time infinitely singular, every other (one) being every (bit) other, whether they be victims of the Iraqi state or victims of the international coalition that accuses the latter of not respecting the law. For in the discourses that dominate during such wars, it is rigorously impossible, on one side and the other, to discern the religious from the moral, the legal, from the political. The warring factions are all irreconcilable fellow worshipers of the religions of the Book. Does that not make things converge once again in the fight to the death that continues to rage on Mount Moriah over the possession of the secret of the sacrifice by an Abraham who never said anything? Do they not fight in order to take possession of the secret of the as the sign of an alliance with God and to impose its order on the other, who becomes for his part nothing more than a murderer

#### Deconstruction is the affirmation of the impossible – embracing the idea that that which is bad can be made good. Even when this possibility is elusive, we must continually reach for it.

Caputo 7 John D. Caputo, “What Would Jesus Deconstruct,” 2007, Print, p. 76-77

#### All along, whether we have been talking about justice or the gift, forgiveness or hospitality, the topic will have been love. Derrida once said, “Deconstruction … is not negative, even though it has often been interpreted as such despite all sorts of warnings. For me, it always accompanies an affirmative exigency, I would even say that it never proceeds without love.” Deconstruction does not take a single step without love; it always follows “in the steps” of love, following love’s call. What does it love? The impossible, the undeconstructible, what is coming, the event. Deconstruction is affirmation, the affirmation of the impossible, of the coming of the event. That is what I called in the preceding chapter the “real beyond the real,” the hyper-real, which participated in the structure of the step/not beyond. Every time a “deconsructive critique” is undertaken, every time something is criticized as a fiction or an unjustifiable assumption, such critiques “are always advanced in the name of the real,” of the irreducible reality of the real, not of the real as the objective, present, perceptible or intelligible thing (res), but of the real as the coming or the event of the other.” But what, then, is the “real”? “The real is this non-negative im-possible, this im-possible coming or invention of the event whose though is not an onto-phenomenology. It is a tough of the event (singularity of the other, in its unanticipatable coming, hic et nuc).” That is a particularly Parisian way of putting the following perfectly clear point. The “real” is precisely what eludes or withdraws from us whenever we think we have gotten it in our grips, whenever we imagine we see it (phenomenology) or can claim “there it is” (ontology) or think we can anticipate it (hermeneutic for-structures). It is the element, the event, in experience that makes experience possible – because when we run into what is real, something is really happening – precisely by never being the thing that slips away, the secret that will not yield to our advances or embrace, like an elusive lover whose play only deepens our desire. The real is what we are trying to make come true, even while it resists our comprehension, our

#### Deconstruction is necessary for a new international that strikes a balance between pure unity and pure multiplicity, one in which history is not predetermined and guided by the need for the United States to securitize, but rather is radically open to the possibility of change.

Caputo ‘97

(John D., David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, pgs. 116-120)

Now, having said this -again very simply, in a way which is too¶ simple - I think we do not have to choose between unity and multiplicity¶ . Of course , deconstruction - that has been its strategy up to¶ now - insisted not on multiplicity for itself but on the heterogeneity the difference, the disassociation , which is absolutely necessary for the¶ relation to the other. What disrupts the totality is the condition for the¶ relation to the other. The privilege granted to unity, to total ity, to¶ organic ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole - th is is a¶ danger for responsibility, for decisio n , for ethics, for politics . That is¶ why I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from¶ being ched up. This is not only a matter of description, of saying that¶ this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of¶ responsibility, of a decision , of ethical commitments . To understand¶ this, you have to pay attention to what I would call singularity. Singularity¶ i s not simply unity or multiplicity. Now, this does not mean that¶ we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever they occur. [ have n ever¶ said anything like that. Of course, we need unity, some gathering,¶ some configuration . You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity - when¶ there is only total ity or unity and when there is only multipli city or¶ disassociation - is a synonym of death . What interests me is the limit¶ of every attempt to totalize, to gather, versammeln - and I will come¶ to this German word in a moment, because it is important for m e - the¶ limit of this u n ifying, uniting movement, the limit that it had to e n counter,¶ because the relationship o f t h e unity t o itself i mplies some dif¶ ference.¶ To be more concrete, take the example of a person or of a c u lture.¶ We often i nsist nowadays on cultural identity - for i nsta n ce, national¶ identity, l i n guistic identity, and so on . Sometimes the struggles under¶ the banner of cultural identity, national identity, linguistic identity,¶ are noble fights. But at the same time the people who fight for their¶ identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self identity¶ of a thing, this glass , for instance, this microphone, but implies¶ a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a¶ way of being different from itself; a culture is different fro m itself; language¶ is different from i tself; the person is different from its elf. Once¶ you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay¶ attention to the other and you understand that fighting for you r own¶ identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity.¶ And this prevents totalitarianism , nationalism , egocentrism, and so¶ on . That is what I tried to demonstrate in the book called The Other¶ Heading: in the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a¶ self-differentiating identity, an identity different from itself, having an¶ open i ng or gap w ithin itself [AC I S-17/0H 9- 1 1 ) . That totally affects¶ a structure, but it is a duty, an ethical and political duty, to take into¶ account this impossibility of being one with oneself. It is because I am¶ not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address the¶ other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility. On the contrary, it¶ is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions.

#### As de The aff is a necessary reimagining of politics. Absent this act of imagination, stagnation is inevitable.

Ingerid S. Straume 11’l |  PhD in the philosophy of education, Papers by Ingerid S. Chapter in "Depoliticization; The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism", edited by Straume and Humphrey, NSU Press2011, <http://uio.academia.edu/IngeridSStraume/Papers/401266/The_Political_Imaginary_of_Global_Capitalism>

Somewhere in the collective imaginary, there isprobably a fairly acute sense of the true state of the construction: No person raised and educated in a modern democracy can be totally ignorant of the planet's limited resources, nor of the interdependence between resource levels, policies of growth, industrial production, and the inflated level of consumption in capitalist societies.The problem is not so much to imagine the disasters ahead, but rather to believe in the possibility of change, as I have argued in the opening sections of this essay. To further the analysis, I now turn to my case in point, education. The following is based on the premise that political creation draws on the capacity to visualize that society could have been different, since society, with its norms, values, and institutions, is a social creation. To account for this premise, Cornelius Castoriadis distinguishes between what he calls the 'instituting' and the 'instituted' society. The instituting society is society's capacity for self-creation; it is society's capacity to create itself as a certain social 'form.'The instituted society is the create, i.e., the product of the instituting society, consisting of laws, norms, and institutions in which significations are embodied.  Society is self-creation. That which' creates society and history is the instituting society, as opposed to the instituted society. The instituting society is the social imaginary in the radical sense. The self-institution of society is the creation of a human world: of 'things/ 'reality,' language, norms, values, ways of life and death, objects for which we live and objects for which we dies- and of course, first and foremost, the creation of the human individual in which the institution of society is massively embedded.57 In order to change the existing institutions (the instituted) and create new social imaginary significations, it is necessary to realize that things could be otherwise. If this insight is not properly instituted, however, society will see itself as a product of forces outside its own control. The instituting society remains unacknowledged, and the instituted society is not conceived as created by society itself. For instance, capitalism could be conceived as a law-like force to which the social world is subject - one that can only be followed and cannot questioned in any profound sense.  In the sociological tradition from Max Weber, this 'deep questioning\* — i.e., political-philosophical questioning—is seen as a defining characteristic of the project of modernity itself. In modernity, the existing (traditional) social values are no longer seen as valid per definition, something which has deep implications for conscious social reproduction, and therefore, education. At least since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the critique of culture and civilization is constitutive of the project of modernity, and a premise of theories and practices of education. A striking example is the critical education,' taught in Nordic schools in the 1970s and 80s as a deliberate counter influence to mass culture.38 In the following, I will argue that this self-critique has now started to turn back on itself, where critique threatens to turn into cultural self-contempt. This becomes quite clear if we analyze the typical relationship between parents and children in contemporary global capitalism in light of the previously developed sections of this paper. Together with the rise of' critical consciousness' in Western societies, at least since '1968,' many parents have found themselves in a social and natural setting that they sometimes find undesirable, even disturbing and harmful. For example, the natural surroundings and countryside, which until today have been very important in the socialization of Norwegian children,39 are no longer representations of pure or clean nature. Things in the countryside, in woods, and water, are now potentially harmful in an 'unnatural\* way. This transformation happened in just a few years. The shocking implication is, of course, thathuman beings are the agents of this destruction — humanity is undermining its own existence. From this fact comes the notion of humanity as inherently harmful. And while we cognitively and technically appear to have the capacity, we still seem unable to stop the destruction of the natural environment. The situation is inherently 'pathological.' Now, ifand when these ideas enter the field of education via literature, educational programs, etc. the pathology is affirmed and consolidated.  In the Nordic countries, for example, children's literature has tended for some time to thematize adulthood, and especially the shortcomings of adults in political and environmental matters. Books and TV-programs illustrate how 'silly' grown-ups are: always in a hurry and through their grown-up-actions ruining the environment. The authors often try to form an alliance with the children against 'the grown-ups.'60 But since the world of grown-ups is the only resource for the child in the process of becoming an adult self, the subject-position offered to the child in this literature is very problematic. Systematically denigrating adults and adult behavior is detrimental to the child's opportunities for identification, as there are no other ideals available. The child is forced to identify with ambivalence or nothing at all. My main point is that the conflict between adults and children portrayed by this literature points to a deeper conflict, between the culture and the individual — or rather, within the culture itself — where the central imaginary significations that organize Western societies, no longer offer sufficient meaning for its members. And since capitalism's significations  — such as rational mastery, consumerism, and instrumentalism - still provide the compass points for our practical orientation as a collective, the situation is deeply 'schizophrenic' It represents a form of alienation, a split within society's self-image, where the relationship between the instituting and the instituted society is distorted. As Slavoj Zizek has pointed out, we detest it, and we don't believe in it, but we still perform and live it.61 The split runs deep, arising within modern society itself, and there is no (rational) escape. This was tragically demonstrated by the Norwegian socialist minister of finance, who probably felt obliged to pose for the photographer holding shopping bags.  Still, the adult world is the only available template onto which the child's aspiration to grow up can be projected. If this world is discredited, the child is left without the cultural resources necessary to build a self. This is the problem that Hannah Arendt addressed in her controversial essay The Crisis in Education, claiming that: "Anyone who refuses to have joint responsibility for the world should not have children and must not be allowed to take part in educating them."62 In Arendt's view, adults have a duty to hand over an 'intact world\* to the next generation — even when they (the adults) wish to change this world, and wish it were otherwise. Practices of education that ignore, or are unable to follow this principle, are in a state of crisis.  Now, while the crisis I have described here is a socio-cultural one, its manifestations — as always —affect people individually and in relation to one another. For instance, children in capitalist societies express in their wishes and actions the demands of a consumer culture - a culture of which many parents are critical. In other words, the consumption-oriented, seemingly selfish attitudes of the young are, to a large extent, attitudes derived from and reflective of the consumer culture at large — played out as conflicts in the home. Hence, the parent or educator is forced to wrestle with problems far beyond the sphere of the personal and educational, such as consumerism, instrumentalism, reification, and cynicism. The  scene is set for individuals to resist their own culture; a fight they can never' win.' Ambivalence and collective self-contempt takes the stage. Depoliticization, as we have seen, rests on the inability of existing institutions to provide sufficiently robust meaning to act as resources for addressing the political problems of the society in question. Put differently: when a society is not able to justify its own significations, it is alienated from itself and its own creative capacity. Under these circumstances, social reproduction becomes very problematic. The instituting society has given birth to a monster — here, the institution of capitalism — and is paralyzed by it. The deepest effect of depoliticization, therefore, is society's abdication of its own creative capacity, which, as I have argued, also implies cultural and personal suffering.

grasp or grip: “Nothing is more ‘realist,’ in this sense, than a deconstruction. It is ce qui arrive (he who/that which arrives or happens).”